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BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS AND GIBRALTAR: 
 TIME FOR A ‘MODUS VIVENDI’?
Dr. AlejAnDro Del VAlle-GálVez 1
The unexpected outcome of  the United Kingdom’s ‘Brexit’ referendum 
on leaving the European Union may have historic and even tragic conse-
quences for Gibraltar, since it necessarily entails both a reconsideration of  
the status of  Gibraltar and changes in Spain’s perspective on a solution to 
the dispute. Following Brexit, negotiations on the UK’s withdrawal from the 
EU will not only pave the way for a new European and international legal 
framework, but will also create an opportunity for Spain to redefine its rela-
tionship with Gibraltar, offering the possibility of  new approaches to resolve 
this historic dispute.
Indeed, the obligation to negotiate a UK withdrawal from the EU will 
compel Gibraltar to redefine its European legal status, regardless of  whe-
ther it remains within or outside EU law. This places Gibraltar in the very 
uncomfortable position of  being forced to seek to negotiate a new arran-
gement within the EU legal framework; unquestionably the framework of  
greatest practical daily application, together with two other international legal 
frameworks, namely the Treaty of  Utrecht and the UN ’doctrine’ about the 
decolonization of  Gibraltar.
A UNIQUE STATUS WITHIN THE EU
Gibraltar has been in the EC/EU since 1973, as part of  the UK’s mem-
bership. EU Law is applicable to Gibraltar, not as a territory of  the UK as a 
Member State, but as a European territory whose external relations the UK 
is responsible for (Article 355.3 TFEU2). The specific position of  Gibraltar 
in the EU has its foundations in the status established in the UK Accession 
Treaty of  1972. As a result, EU Law is applicable in Gibraltar, with some 
1 Co-Director of  the Journal Cuadernos de Gibraltar/Gibraltar Reports..
2 Article 355.- In addition to the provisions of  Article 52 of  the Treaty on European Union 
relating to the territorial scope of  the Treaties, the following provisions shall apply:
(…)3. The provisions of  the Treaties shall apply to the European territories for whose exter-
nal relations a Member State is responsible.
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significant particularities, given that certain parts of  the EC Treaty do not 
apply to Gibraltar.
In fact, Gibraltar is excluded from some whole areas of  the EU legisla-
tion: Customs Union territory; Common Commercial Policy; Rules on the 
free movement of  goods; Common Agricultural Policy and the Common 
Fisheries Policy; obligation to levy VAT; and the territory of  Gibraltar is not 
part of  the Schengen Area, as a consequence of  the non-participation of  
the UK in the Schengen Treaties; this position continues today in the EU 
(Protocoles 20 and 21 to the TEU and the TFEU, by the Treaty of  Lisbon). 
With these exceptions, EU Law is fully applicable, and Gibraltar must comply 
with all Community legislation that it is not expressly exempt from: transport 
policy, environment legislation, taxation and other EU policies.
The European framework will continue to apply for at least the two years 
during which withdrawal negotiations are held, and could even be subse-
quently extended, thus providing sufficient legal certainty concerning appli-
cable law in the coming years. However, the effects of  uncertainty could 
have a very negative impact on the economy of  Gibraltar, whose population 
adopted a clear stance in favour of  ‘Bremain’ in the referendum. Furthermo-
re, a possible return to the 1713 Treaty of  Utrecht has raised fears of  the very 
probable legality of  closing the border, at Spain’s instigation, in the unlikely 
event that EU law ceases to be applicable in the future.
EU-BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS, SPAIN AND GIBRALTAR
The unavoidable renegotiation of  Gibraltar’s unique status within the 
EU will inevitably involve Spain, which in 1986 did not question the status 
endowed in 1972 but may well do so now, in defence of  its interests. In the 
present context, Spain could leverage the requirement for unanimity at seve-
ral crucial moments during the process of  negotiating British withdrawal as 
regulated by Art. 50 of  the Treaty on European Union (TEU)3; thus, various 
3  Consolidated version of  the Treaty on European Union OJ C 202, 7.6.2016. Arti-
cle 50:
“1.   Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements.
2.   A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of  its 
intention. In the light of  the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall 
negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its 
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possible future scenarios for Gibraltar, such as the Norwegian or Swiss mo-
dels or the antecedent of  (reverse) Greenland case, will depend on Spain’s 
consent. In addition, these kind of  solutions that seek to maintain application 
of  the European Single Market to Gibraltar would in practice be unworkable 
in the international arena, for two main reasons: A) Gibraltar is not part of  
the British State “United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland”, 
and B) Independently of  the British legislation that considers Gibraltar a 
“British Overseas Territory”, its only legal status under International Law -re-
cognised by the UN and the international Community- is that of  a non-self  
governing territory (administered by the UK since 1946) awaiting decolonisa-
tion in a process supervised by the United Nations.
At the same time, Brexit has opened a window of  opportunity for resol-
ving this historical dispute, which encompasses both peaceful coexistence 
between Spain and the small neighbouring community of  Gibraltar just over 
the border, and the question of  sovereignty that underlies the dispute with 
the United Kingdom.
The acting Spanish Government took two important decisions in 2016: 
it announced the need to negotiate the status of  Gibraltar outside the fra-
mework of  TEU Art. 50, and it proposed a joint sovereignty model to solve 
the dispute.
The Spanish position of  exclusion of  Gibraltar from the EU list of  to-
pics for negotiation with the UK, has had so far the unanimous support 
of  the remaining EU Member States. The European Council received the 
withdrawal, taking account of  the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That 
agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of  the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of  the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf  of  the Union by the Coun-
cil, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of  the European Parliament.
3.   The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of  entry into force 
of  the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in 
paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, 
unanimously decides to extend this period.
4.   For the purposes of  paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of  the European Council or of  
the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discus-
sions of  the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of  the Treaty on 
the Functioning of  the European Union.
5.   If  a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject 
to the procedure referred to in Article 49.”
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letter from the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, notifying the United 
Kingdom’s intention to leave the European Union, the 29 March 2017; and 
two days later the draft European Council guidelines following the United 
Kingdom’s notification under Article 50 TEU included this point: ”After the 
United Kingdom leaves the Union, no agreement between the EU and the 
United Kingdom may apply to the territory of  Gibraltar without the agree-
ment between the Kingdom of  Spain and the United Kingdom.” The Special 
European Council (Article 50), in an EU 27 format, adopted the guidelines 
for the Brexit negotiations the 29 April 2017, and approved this guideline 
about Gibraltar (point 24)4. So in principle any decision about the application 
in the future of  the EU Law in Gibraltar is conditioned to a previous Briti-
sh-Spanish agreement.
THE SPANISH JOINT SOVEREIGNTY PROPOSAL
The option of  joint sovereignty formally presented in September-Oc-
tober 2016 to the UN and to the EU Institutions and Member States, was 
firmly announced as an overall solution. The basic ideas of  this proposal are: 
transitional joint sovereignty between the UK and Spain, British and Spani-
sh nationality, Statute of  Autonomy (Art. 144 of  the Spanish Constitution); 
Spain would assume responsibility for external relations after the UK’s effec-
tive withdrawal from the EU; Gibraltar would remain part of  the EU; the 
border/fence and border controls would disappear.
The offer revives measures suggested in previous joint sovereignty pro-
posals. This recurrent idea has been passed around the negotiating tables of  
the dispute for some time.  Even joint sovereignty was expressly negotiated 
in the period 2001-2002 by the Blair and Aznar Governments, undoubtedly 
the most advanced stage of  negotiation reached towards a final solution to 
the Anglo-Spanish dispute.
In my opinion, several objective questions can be raised today against 
the idea of  joint sovereignty. The first of  these is that following the 2002 
referendum in Gibraltar, joint sovereignty has been called into question or 
discredited. Unlike the negotiations in 2001-2002, the UK has adopted since 
2006 a different stance, whereby it will not take or advance in any direction 
4 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29-euco-brex-
it-guidelines/
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on sovereignty without prior Gibraltarian agreement. Even the UN General 
Assembly’s Fourth Committee (Decolonization) now reflects this British new 
position in its 2016 Decision (“Takes note of  the position of  the United 
Kingdom on this issue, that is, the commitment never to enter into arrange-
ments [...] nor enter into a process of  sovereignty negotiations with which 
Gibraltar is not content”)5. This is why Spain-UK bilateral negotiations do 
not offer any prospects for progress, and in any case Gibraltar has announced 
to boycott any move towards joint sovereignty.
Second, the proposal made unilaterally by the conservative Government 
of  M. Rajoy, without looking for previous supporting consensus inside Spain, 
formally expressed by the Cortes. And third the most practical problem which 
is that the proposal inextricably links cross-border cooperation with the reso-
lution of  the sovereignty dispute, this creates an impasse given that both the 
UK and Gibraltar have already rejected joint sovereignty. Anyway, the Blair/
Aznar joint sovereignty negotiations showed how complex it can be to reach 
a complete agreement, given the existence of  nuclear “red lines”: for Spain, 
the temporary or transitional (not definitive) nature of  joint sovereignty; or 
for the UK, the maintaining of  exclusive command and control of  military 
bases in Gibraltar.
THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF SPAIN, UK AND GIBRALTAR
Is there any alternative in this negotiation deadlock ? First of  all, we must 
take onto account the fundamental interests of  the stakeholders involved: for 
Spain, recovering some form of  sovereignty over the kingdom’s lost city; for 
the UK, the incalculable strategic value and advantage of  maintaining naval 
and air bases and intelligence operations in the Strait of  Gibraltar; and for 
Gibraltar, consultation and the power to decide on its future respecting its 
specific identity. For all parties, the problem is of  a highly symbolic nature 
and then has a strong irrational component, but also requires real willingness 
to compromise in order to achieve an imaginative and enriching solution for 
all, particularly for Campo de Gibraltar, whose interests the Spanish authori-
ties should increasingly adopt as their own.
5 Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee), Draft decision submit-
ted by the Chair- Question of  Gibraltar, 07.11.2016, Doc. A/C.4/71/L.17. Approved by the 
UN General Assembly the 6th December 2016, see http://undocs.org/en/A/C.4/71/L.17
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I therefore advocate a twofold approach in the current historical nego-
tiating situation for the UK’s departure from the EU: a Modus Vivendi for 
cross-border coexistence, and in parallel an agreement to seek a new inter-
national and European model for Gibraltar, trying to put an end to historical 
controversy.
A PROVISIONAL MODUS VIVENDI  
In the current situation, it is in the best interest of  all to reach an interim 
agreement for the normalization of  cross-border coexistence, which can be 
adopted according to the known formula in International Law of  a Modus Vi-
vendi. This kind of  instrument can settle a provisional arrangement between 
subjects of  International Law, giving rise to binding obligations in order to 
regulate temporarily a certain situation, and can be later replaced by a formal 
and permanent Agreement.
In my opinion, it should be necessary to reach an agreement on  -at least- 
the following aspects. First, the Border/Fence, which is an EU land external 
border. The issue of  controls and fluidity at the border crossing point is cru-
cial for cross-border standardization, especially considering the existence of  
thousands of  workers crossing the border every day. In particular, a border 
traffic agreement becomes more necessary in the light of  the new EU Re-
gulation regarding the reinforcement of  checks at external borders (entered 
into force on 07 April 2017)6. However there are other peremptory issues that 
should be included equally in the Modus Vivendi. An agreement for the exer-
cise of  jurisdiction over navigation, and on police intervention in the waters 
of  the Bay. The moment can also be opportune to address Spain’s concerns 
about financial activities and fiscal transparency, setting out an agreement on 
coordination in these economic activities. Regarding the airport, negotiate 
the normalization of  its use, by suspending existing restrictions and the ex-
clusion of  European regulations. It could also be the natural framework for 
consolidating an institutional boost to Gibraltar-Campo Gibraltar Cross-Bor-
6 Regulation (EU) 2017/458 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  15 March 
2017, amending regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the reinforcement of  checks against 
relevant databases at external borders, OJ L 74, 18.03.2017, p. 1-7. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R0458&from=ES.
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der Cooperation, which could lead to the creation of  a European Grouping 
of  Territorial Cooperation (EGTC).
In my opinion, the agreement for cross-border coexistence that we call 
Modus Vivendi could be adopted considering three basic elements: A) Conti-
nuity of  application of  EU law in the current conditions, until new condi-
tions come into force as part of  the negotiations to exit the UK.  B) Nego-
tiation by UK and Spain, incorporating Gibraltar, the EU and the regional 
and local authorities (Junta de Andalucía / Campo de Gibraltar), depending 
on the respective competencies. C) Formally, the Modus Vivendi Agreement 
must be adopted by the United Kingdom and Spain, and where appropriate 
attributing to the EU the guarantee of  its application.
SOVEREIGNTY NEGOTIATIONS
Spain cannot, in my opinion propose a Modus Vivendi, without at the same 
time raising the claim of  sovereignty. In accordance with the resolutions and 
decisions of  the UN General Assembly (1965-2016), it must request Spani-
sh-British negotiations to establish a new and permanent statute for Gibral-
tar, linked to the EU, and which entails the decolonization of  the territory 
and the termination of  the Treaty of  Utrecht.
In my view, an agreement should be sought, in parallel with the Modus 
Vivendi, to open negotiations on the desirable model of  a definitive solution 
to the Gibraltar question. This agreement to initiate sovereignty negotiations 
could count on the presence of  the EU as an observer, being alternative or 
complementary to the Brussels Agreement of  1984.
With this agreement to open negotiations in the most reserved areas of  
the controversy, Spain and the UK could consider exploring the search for a 
format inspired by new imaginative proposals. We discard the formula of  the 
joint sovereignty since as we have indicated we do not consider it a workable 
model for starting negotiations. In contrast, other new formulas could be, 
for example, the Principality of  Gibraltar or City of  the British and Spanish 
Crowns, formally integrated in the Kingdom of  Spain and therefore in the 
EU, institutionally linked to the Campo de Gibraltar, and with maintenance 
of  the current British jurisdiction and organization of  Gibraltar. This new 
model can explore an internationalized statute supervised by the EU. Howe-
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ver, a complementary British-Spanish agreement on military bases would be 
necessary, with probable anchoring in the NATO framework.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I should finish by highlighting that the ‘Modus Vivendi’ would be a provi-
sional measure pending the settlement of  a new international and European 
status. The agreement for the commencement of  negotiations on sovereign-
ty, as well as the ‘Modus Vivendi’ accord, could be incorporated in the Treaty 
on the UK’s withdrawal from and future relationship with the EU by way of  
a Protocol or Declaration. Each has a different legal and jurisdictional effect 
since Protocols form part of  an international Treaty.
Anyway, we must be aware that the current situation is not favourable for 
the presentation of  major initiatives to solve the complex issues linked to the 
historical controversy, including those of  coexistence with the surrounding 
area of  the Campo de Gibraltar. The policy period of  confrontation with 
Gibraltar (particularly the years 2013-2015) also meant the annulment of  the 
Forum of  Dialogue 2006 agreements for the normalization of  cross-border 
coexistence. The historical distrust towards Spain is added to the very delica-
te situation of  Gibraltar and the United Kingdom when Brexit negotiations 
begin.

